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Jackson v. Housing Authority: The Availability of Punitive
Damages in Wrongful Death Actions Against
Municipal Corporations
An attorney represents the administrator of the estate of an elderly woman
who met an untimely death as the tragic result of a city worker's wanton and
reckless negligence. Naturally, the administrator chooses to sue, and the attor-
ney, mindful that the taxpaying public will ultimately pay any damages
awarded, questions whether his client should be able to recover punitive dam-
ages against the city in the action for wrongful death. In Jackson v. Housing
Authority 1 the North Carolina Supreme Court decided this issue of first impres-
sion by holding that a plaintiff may recover punitive damages against a defend-
ant municipal corporation in an action brought pursuant to the North Carolina
Wrongful Death Act.2 Justice Meyer, joined by Chief Justice Branch, vigor-
ously dissented from Justice Billings' majority opinion. Justice Meyer argued,
first, that the court had misconstrued the Wrongful Death Act and, second, that
the court had misapplied the general rule that, absent an express statutory provi-
sion to the contrary, punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipal
corporation.3 Indeed, a thorough analysis of the court's majority holding
reveals that, although espousing a rule seemingly consistent with a major princi-
ple of statutory construction, the Jackson opinion nonetheless misinterprets the
Wrongful Death Act. Furthermore, as Justice Meyer contended, the Jackson
majority disregarded a catalog of public policy considerations militating against
the recovery of punitive damages from municipal corporations. 4
On February 19, 1978, Mary Magdalene Jackson, an eighty-four year old
woman, was found dead at her High Point, North Carolina residence in the
Clara Cox Apartments, a low income housing project owned and operated by
the Housing Authority for the City of High Point.5 The cause of death was
carbon monoxide poisoning.6 Willie H. Jackson, the son of the decedent and
1. 316 N.C. 259, 341 S.E.2d 523 (1986).
2. Id. at 265, 341 S.E.2d at 526. The North Carolina Wrongful Death Act provides in part:
(a) When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of
another, such as would, if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action for
damages therefor, the person or corporation that would have been so liable, and his or their
personal representatives or collectors, shall be liable to an action for damages ....
(b) Damages recoverable for death by wrongful act include:
(5) Such punitive damages as the decedent could have recovered had he survived,
and punitive damages for wrongfully causing the death of the decedent through malicious-
ness, wilful or wanton injury, or gross negligence ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984).
3. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 265, 341 S.E.2d at 527 (Meyer, J., dissenting, joined by Branch, C.J.);
see also Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 208, 293 S.E.2d 101, 115 (1982) (stating the general
rule prohibiting the recovery of punitive damages against municipal corporations).
4. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 268-72, 341 S.E.2d at 529-31 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 260, 341 S.E.2d at 524; Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 2-4, Jackson (No. 8318
SCl118).
6. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 260, 341 S.E.2d at 524.
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administrator of her estate, filed suit against the Housing Authority, alleging
that the fatal carbon monoxide exposure had been the result of a blockage in the
chimney pipe connecting the decedent's chimney and natural gas heater.7 Plain-
tiff Jackson sued on theories of negligence, strict liability, breach of contract,
and breach of express and implied warranties of habitability.8 Furthermore, in-
cident to the negligence and breach of warranty claims, Jackson asserted claims
for punitive damages, charging the Housing Authority with willful, wanton, and
gross negligence, and with intentional, malicious, and wanton conduct with re-
spect to the alleged breaches of warranty.9 Finally, plaintiff10 amended the
complaint and appended a claim for wrongful death. 1
In November 1982 the trial court allowed defendant's pretrial motion to
dismiss plaintiff's claims for punitive damages.12 At the close of plaintiff's evi-
dence, the court awarded the Housing Authority a directed verdict on all claims,
including the claims for punitive damages.'
3
In ordering a new trial, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's holding with respect to all but plaintiff's strict liability and breach of
contract claims. 14 The court of appeals concluded that the negligence and
breach of implied warranty of habitability claims presented legitimate issues for
the trial court' s and that punitive damages are recoverable against a municipal
corporation in an action brought under North Carolina's Wrongful Death
Act.1 6 The court of appeals acknowledged that the question whether punitive
damages are available against a municipal corporation in an action brought pur-
suant to North Carolina's Wrongful Death Act was an issue of first impression
in North Carolina.1 7 Judge Phillips, writing for the majority, stated that the
7. City workers discovered a bird's nest, a bird carcass, and other debris in the chimney pipe.
Id.; Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 4.
8. The basis of plaintiff's negligence claim was the Housing Authority's alleged failure to
exercise reasonable care in maintaining the heating lines. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 260, 341 S.E.2d at
524. The strict liability claim rested on defendant's alleged violation of its statutory obligation to
provide tenants with fit premises. Id; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-42 (1984); Record at 1-4. The
breach of contract and warranty claims arose out of the Housing Authority's alleged failure to main-
tain the premises in a safe and sanitary condition. Record at 4-5.
9. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 260, 341 S.E.2d at 524.
10. Approximately one year after filing suit, but before the action came to trial, Willie Jackson
died. Linda Jackson, the new administratrix of the decedent's estate, assumed the role of plaintiff in
the action. Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 2.
11. Record at 15.
12. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 261, 341 S.E.2d at 524. The trial court ruled that punitive damages
are not recoverable against municipal corporations. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 19, Jackson v.
Housing Auth., 73 N.C. App. 363, 326 S.E.2d 295 (1985) (No. 8318SCI118), aff'd, 316 N.C. 259,
341 S.E.2d 523 (1986).
13. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 261, 341 S.E.2d at 524. Curiously, the trial court never explained why
it granted the directed verdict on the punitive damage claims, which had already been dismissed.
See infra note 24.
14. The court of appeals reasoned that defendant Housing Authority could not be held strictly
liable because providing a tenant with heat in the form of natural gas does not constitute an ul-
trahazardous activity. Jackson v. Housing Auth., 73 N.C. App. 363, 373, 326 S.E.2d 295, 301
(1985), aff'd, 316 N.C. 259, 341 S.E.2d 523 (1986).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 371, 326 S.E.2d at 300; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984).
17. Jackson, 73 N.C. App. at 370, 326 S.E.2d at 299.
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Wrongful Death Act contains no language insulating municipal corporations
from liability for punitive damages.18 Judge Webb, however, argued in dissent
that the court of appeals had overstepped its bounds in considering this issue,
because the evidence in the record would not have supported a finding of wan-
ton, willful, or malicious conduct.19
Defendant Housing Authority, based on Judge Webb's dissent, filed notice
of appeal with the North Carolina Supreme Court on the issue of punitive dam-
ages.20 Because the supreme court's review of an appeal as of right is limited to
an examination of the issues specifically considered in the dissenting opinion
giving rise to the appeal, 2 1 the Housing Authority also filed a petition for discre-
tionary review of the lower appellate court's order for a new trial.22 The petition
for discretionary review, however, was denied, 23 and the supreme court there-
fore considered only the issue of the availability of punitive damages against a
municipal corporation in an action brought under North Carolina's Wrongful
Death Act. 24
The supreme court first addressed the rule set forth in Long v. City of Char-
lotte.25 In Long the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled that in the absence of
18. Id. at 371, 326 S.E.2d at 300. The court of appeals also declared that, as a matter of policy,
indigent tenants of public housing should enjoy the same rights of recovery as tenants renting from
private landlords. Id. Therefore, according to the court, it would be inequitable to deny a tenant the
opportunity to recover punitive damages from a public housing authority in cases in which such
damages would be available to tenants of private landlords. Id. (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (reasoning that actions which adversely affect one
race more than another suggest a discriminatory purpose)).
19. Id. at 374, 326 S.E.2d at 301 (Webb, J., dissenting); see also Brief for Defendant-Appellee at
17 (contending that the record was devoid of any evidence of maliciousness, willfulness, or gross
negligence).
20. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 261, 341 S.E.2d at 524.
21. See N.C.R. App. P. 16(b).
22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31 (1986). If a party fails to qualify for an appeal as of right to
the North Carolina Supreme Court under North Carolina General Statutes § 7A-30, he or she may
seek the supreme court's discretionary review of the lower court holding pursuant to North Carolina
General Statutes § 7A-31. The latter section provides for discretionary review when, for example,
the subject matter of the appeal involves "significant public interest," or "legal principles of major
significance to the jurisprudence" of North Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b) (1986).
23. Jackson v. Housing Auth., 313 N.C. 603, 330 S.E.2d 610 (1986), denying disc rev. to 73
N.C. App. 363, 326 S.E.2d. 295 (1985).
24. Neither party was certain of the actual issue on appeal. Plaintiff contended that the only
issue before the court was the sufficiency of the evidence to support an award of punitive damages,
the question addressed in Judge Webb's dissent. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 261, 341 S.E.2d at 524-25.
The Housing Authority, however, argued that the question of sufficiency of the evidence was never
before the court because the punitive damage claims had been dismissed before trial. Id. at 261, 341
S.E.2d at 525. Moreover, according to defendant the trial court's directed verdict on the punitive
damage claims was superfluous, and Judge Webb's dissent related to the trial court's dismissal of,
rather than the directed verdict on, the punitive damage claims. Id. Therefore, the issue necessarily
was whether the trial court erred in dismissing the punitive damage claims on the grounds that a
municipal corporation is not liable for punitive damages in an action brought under the wrongful
death statute. Id.
The supreme court acknowledged this procedural confusion, and because both parties were
prepared to argue the issue of the availability of punitive damages against the defendant Housing
Authority, the court agreed to entertain this issue, rather than the evidentiary question. Id. at 262,
341 S.E.2d at 525; see N.C. R. App. P. 2 (permitting the supreme court to alter the procedural rules
to prevent hardship to a party or to facilitate a decision in the public interest). Thus, the court
spared itself the task of untangling the procedural disorder.
25. 306 N.C. 187, 293 S.E.2d 101 (1982).
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an explicit statutory provision to the contrary, a municipal corporation would be
exempt from the assessment of punitive damages.2 6 The Jackson court classified
defendant as a municipal corporation and confirmed the applicability of the rule
in Long.27 Next, the court considered the question whether North Carolina's
Wrongful Death Act,2 8 the basis of Jackson's action, explicitly provides for the
recovery of punitive damages against a municipal corporation. The court noted
that, by the terms of the statute, the "person or corporation" 2 9 liable for the
wrongful death also may be accountable for punitive damages. 30 Furthermore,
the court recognized that for purposes of statutory construction, the term "per-
son" may mean a natural person, a corporation, or a body politic, and thus
encompasses a municipal corporation. 31 The court surmised that the North
Carolina General Assembly presumably drafted the Wrongful Death Act with
this rule of statutory construction in mind and, therefore, intended to subject
municipal corporations to liability for punitive damages in appropriate
circumstances.
32
To understand the significance of the Jackson court's treatment of this is-
sue, it is necessary to consider the history of municipal immunity in tort. The
common-law doctrine of municipal immunity originated in 1798, in the English
case of Russell v. Men of Devon.33 Early North Carolina cases, however, re-
jected the doctrine34 because municipal immunity was not yet a part of the Eng-
26. Id. at 208, 293 S.E.2d at 115.
27. See Jackson, 316 N.C. at 262, 341 S.E.2d at 525 (citing Cox v. City of Kinston, 217 N.C.
391, 393-94, 8 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1940) (holding that a public housing authority is a municipal
corporation)).
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984).
29. Id. § 28A-18-2(a). For the statutory language, see supra note 2.
30. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 263-64, 341 S.E.2d at 526.
31. See id. at 263, 341 S.E.2d at 526. North Carolina General Statutes § 12-3 provides that
"unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the General Assembly,
... (6) The word 'person' shall extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate, as well as to
individuals, unless the context clearly shows to the contrary." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12-3 (1986).
32. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 264-65, 341 S.E.2d at 526.
33. 2 Term. Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). In Russell the court ruled that an unincorpo-
rated town could not be held liable for damage caused by a defective bridge. When Russell was
decided, municipalities were not separate governmental entities, so claims asserted against munici-
palities were essentially claims against entire city populations. For a review of the history of the
development of the municipal immunity doctrine, see Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 851-
53 (W. Va. 1975); PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs § 131, at 1051 (W. Keeton 5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Pro-
posed Statutory Reform, 20 A.B.A. J. 747, 747-48 (1934); James, Tort Liability of Governmental
Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 610, 621-23 (1955); Note, Municipal Tort Immunity in
Virginia, 68 VA. L. REv. 639, 640-41 (1982); 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, School and State Tort
Liability § 28 (1971). Thus, the basis for the immunity was the theretofore unusual nature of, and
lack of precedent for, an action levied against an entire city population. See City of Weirton, 214
S.E.2d at 852; PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 131, at 1051; James, supra, at 621; Note, supra, at 640.
In addition, no city treasuries existed to satisfy adverse judgments. See Russell, 2 Term. Rep. at 668,
100 Eng. Rep. at 360; City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d at 852; PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 131, at 1051;
Note, supra, at 640. Municipal immunity, therefore, enjoyed a rationale different from that of the
doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity, whose precept was that "the king can do no
wrong." See PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 131, at 1051; Comment, Local Government Sovereign
Immunity: The Need for Reform, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 43, 43 (1982).
34. See Wright v. City of Wilmington, 92 N.C. 156 (1885); Meares v. Commissioners, 31 N.C.
(1 Ired.) 73 (1848).
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lish common law when the North Carolina General Assembly adopted the
English common law as of the date of the Declaration of Independence. 35 In
1885 the North Carolina courts finally recognized municipal immunity in Mof-
fitt v. City of Asheville,36 and the doctrine eventually established itself firmly in
North Carolina law.
37
Although the doctrine of municipal immunity enjoys certain justifications
that remain valid in modem times,38 inroads on the doctrine have gradually
evolved.3 9 For example, several states have simply abolished the principle,
either by judicial decision or by statute.4° Indeed, the American Law Institute
presently states that municipalities enjoy no general immunity.41 The North
Carolina General Assembly, sensitive to this general trend, has declared that
municipalities may be held liable to the extent of their liability insurance cover-
age.4 2 Naturally, once a municipality may be sued, the availability of punitive
35. See LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA 1777-1778, ch. V, § 2 (1778), reprinted in 24 THE STATE
RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA, ch. V, § 2, at 162 (Clark ed. 1905). See generally Steelman v. City
of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 591-94, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241-42 (1971) (tracing the history of municipal
immunity in North Carolina).
36. 103 N.C. 237, 255, 9 S.E. 695, 697 (1889) (municipality not liable for plaintiff's illness
resulting from the municipality's alleged failure to maintain a warm and habitable prison cell).
37. See Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 311-12, 222 S.E.2d 412, 418-19 (1976); Steelman v. City
of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 594, 184 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1971); Casey v. Wake County, 45 N.C. App.
522, 523, 263 S.E.2d 360, 361, disc rev. denied, 300 N.C. 371, 267 S.E.2d 673 (1980).
38. Municipalities earn no profits and, therefore, are unable to compensate injured plaintiffs
without diverting tax funds that are intended to serve public purposes. PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 33, § 131, at 1051-52; Borchard, supra note 33, at 748; James, supra note 33, at 614; Note, supra
note 33, at 643; 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 28, at 40 (1971).
Moreover, impending threats of liability and fiscal disaster resulting from the payment of damage
awards may inhibit the local government's decision-making process. See Borchard, supra note 33, at
748; James, supra note 33, at 614; Note, supra note 33, at 643; see also infra notes 106-07 and
accompanying text (discussing the risk of fiscal devastation to municipal corporations posed by the
malicious conduct and negligent acts and omissions of municipal employees). See generally PROSSER
& KEETON, supra note 33, § 131, at 1052 (discussing the obsolescence of the rationale underlying
municipal immunity and the various state decisions abolishing the doctrine).
39. Certain reasons for the creation of the municipal immunity, see supra note 33, no longer
apply, because municipalities are now separate governmental entities. Municipal corporations, as
self-governing bodies, undertake and must accept responsibility for the consequences of various pub-
lic services. In addition, municipalities enjoy the power to tax and, therefore, can afford to compen-
sate injured plaintiffs. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 131, at 1052; Note, supra note 33, at
644-49. As a result, there have been many efforts by state legislatures to limit or abolish the doc-
trine. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 131, at 1052; Note, supra note 33, at 639 n.2; see infra
note 40.
40. See, eg., Gorrell v. City of Parsons, 223 Kan. 645, 650, 576 P.2d 616, 620 (1978) ("We
conclude that the rule that a municipality is not liable for the negligent acts of its officers and em-
ployees in the performance of a 'governmental' function should be abolished. It does not promote
justice, and serves no rational purpose."); Long v. City of Weirton, 214 S.E.2d 832, 859 (W. Va.
1975) (abrogating municipal tort immunity because of changing social needs, growing governmental
responsibilities, and the risks to individuals flowing from increasing governmental activities); Oroz v.
Board of County Comm'rs, 575 P.2d 1155, 1158 (Wyo. 1978) (repudiating municipal immunity and
declaring it anachronistic and obsolete: "Henceforth, the rule is liability-the exception is immunity
.... "); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-20-202 to -206 (1980) (removing municipal immunity for injuries
resulting from unsafe streets and highways, dangerous structures, and negligent acts and omissions
of municipal employees). See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 131, at 1052 (discuss-
ing the obsolescence of the rationale underlying municipal immunity and the various state decisions
abolishing the doctrine).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895C (1977).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (1982). In Steelman v. City of New Bern, 279 N.C. 589, 184
S.E.2d 239 (1971), the North Carolina Supreme Court discussed the general assembly's past at-
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damages becomes an issue.43
Arguably, municipal immunity from punitive damages is unrelated to the
old common-law rule of general municipal immunity, because of the special na-
ture of punitive damages and because an entirely different set of reasons supports
the maintenance of municipal immunity against punitive damages.44 The princi-
pal purposes of punitive damages are to punish the wrongdoer for his or her
aggravated conduct and to deter others from committing similar offenses. 45 Pu-
nitive damages are not compensatory and are not a matter of right for the plain-
tiff.46 An award of punitive damages requires a showing of aggravated conduct
such as malice, fraudulent motive, or deliberate, wanton disregard of the rights
of others.47 Indeed, the concept underlying punitive damages is an example of
the criminal law's influence on the law of torts.4 8 This concept has been called
"an anomaly in the law" in North Carolina. 49
Because of the extraordinary nature of punitive damages, courts have devel-
oped a common-law rule prohibiting the recovery of punitive damages against
municipal corporations.50 The principal explanation for the maintenance of this
rule, despite the demise of general municipal immunity, is that an assessment of
punitive damages against a municipal corporation would not satisfy the two fun-
damental purposes of punitive damages: punishment and deterrence.51 Courts
tempts to eliminate the doctrine of municipal immunity. "The General Assembly has modified the
doctrine but has never abolished it. In fact, a bill was introduced in the 1971 General Assembly to
abolish governmental immunity in its entirety, but this bill failed to pass." Id. at 595, 184 S.E.2d at
243. The court conceded that the immunity might be obsolete, but because of the doctrine's estab-
lished place in North Carolina jurisprudence, the court asserted that "any further modification or
the repeal of the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the General Assembly, not this
Court." Id.
43. See Note, Punitive Damage Liability of Municipal Corporations, 22 WASH. & LEE L. Rv.
126, 128 (1965) (discussing the relationship between sovereign immunity and the rule prohibiting the
recovery of punitive damages against municipal corporations).
44. See George v. Chicago Transit Auth., 58 Ill. App. 3d 692, 694, 374 N.E.2d 679, 681
(1978); Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 339 Pa. Super. 15, 27, 488 A.2d 284, 291 (1985);
Township of Bensalem v. Press, 93 Pa. Commw. 235, 248-49, 501 A.2d 331, 338 (1985). But see
Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 620 (Iowa 1978) (associating the rule precluding the
recovery of punitive damages against municipal corporations with the general doctrine of municipal
tort immunity); Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 149 (Minn. 1980) (discussing policy
arguments underlying the allowance of punitive damages against municipal corporations in the con-
text of general sovereign immunity).
45. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 2, at 9; Ervin, Punitive Damages in North Caro-
lina, 59 N.C.L. REv. 1255, 1256 (1981). Butsee Ray v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich. App. 702, 707,242
N.W.2d 494, 496 (1976) (mentioning an additional purpose of reimbursing the plaintiff).
46. See Hardy v. Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 306, 218 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1975); Allred v. Graves, 261
N.C. 31, 35, 134 S.E.2d 186, 190 (1964); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 2, at 9; Ervin, supra
note 45, at 1255.
47. See Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N.C. 23, 27, 92 S.E.2d 393, 396 (1956); Lutz Indus. v. Dixie
Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 344, 88 S.E.2d 333, 342 (1955); Binder v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 516, 23 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1943); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 2, at 9.
48. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 2, at 9-10.
49. Ervin, supra note 45, at 1256.
50. See, eg., City of Gary v. Falcone, 169 Ind. App. 295, 296, 348 N.E.2d 41, 42 (1976);
Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 56 N.Y.2d 332, 334, 437 N.E.2d 1104, 1105, 452 N.Y.S.2d 347, 348
(1982); Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 339 Pa. Super. 15, 27, 488 A.2d 284, 291 (1985);
Cole v. City of Houston, 442 S.W.2d 445, 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969).
51. See 18 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.18a, at 221 (3d rev.
ed. 1984); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 2, at 12.
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and scholars agree that if such damages were available against municipal corpo-
rations, the impact of the award would fall on innocent taxpayers, and the party
truly responsible would not be punished. 52 Furthermore, plaintiffs have typi-
cally been unable to convince the courts that the added threat of punitive dam-
ages against municipal corporations would deter public officials from engaging
in the wanton and willful conduct that typically calls for the imposition of such
damages.5 3 Generally, courts bar recovery of punitive damages against munici-
palities despite the trend towards broader municipal liability.5
4
Presently, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions endorse the rule that,
absent an explicit statutory provision to the contrary, punitive damages are not
recoverable against a municipal corporation. 55 In 1982 the North Carolina
52. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981); Smith v.
District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831, 832 (D.C. 1975); Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d
810, 814 (Mo. 1968); Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Okla. 1976); 18 E. McQuiL-
LIN, supra note 51, § 53.18a, at 221; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, § 2, at 12; Morris, Punitive
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173, 1204 (1931); Note, Punitive Damage Liability of
Municipal Corporations in Pennsylvania, 84 DICK. L. REv. 267, 274 (1979-80).
53. See, eg., Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831, 832 (D.C. 1975); City of Gary v.
Falcone, 169 Ind. App. 295, 296-97, 348 N.E.2d 41, 42 (1976); Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio
St. 2d 1, 6-7, 321 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1975); 18 E. McQUILLiN, supra note 51, § 53.18a, at 221; Morris,
supra note 52, at 1204; Note, supra note 52, at 275.
54. See, eg., 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 51, § 53.18a, at 221; PROSSER & KEETON, supra
note 33, § 2, at 12.
55. 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 51,_§ 53.18a, at 221-22; Annotation, Recovery of Exemplary
or Punitive Damages from Municipal Corporations, 1 A.L.R.4th 448 (1980); see, eg., State v.
Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 66, 579 P.2d 568, 570 (1978); Smith v. District of Columbia, 336 A.2d 831,
832 (D.C. 1975); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); City of Columbus v.
Myszka, 246 Ga. 571, 573, 272 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1980); Fulton County v. Baranan, 240 Ga. 837, 838,
242 S.E.2d 617, 619 (1978), cert denied, 461 U.S. 929 (1983); Sudeikis v. Chicago Transit Auth., 81
Ill. App. 3d 838, 842, 401 N.E.2d 1114, 1117 (1980); George v. Chicago Transit Auth., 58 Ill. App.
3d 692, 693, 374 N.E.2d 679, 680 (1978); Speer v. City of Dodge City, 6 Kan. App. 2d 798, 800-01,
636 P.2d 178, 181 (1981); McHugh v. City of Wichita, 1 Kan. App. 2d 180, 183-84, 563 P.2d 497,
500 (1977); Foss v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 309 A.2d 339, 345 (Me. 1973); Michaud v. City of
Bangor, 160 Me. 285, 288, 203 A.2d 687, 689 (1964); Herilla v. Mayor of Baltimore, 37 Md. App.
481, 492, 378 A.2d 162, 169 (1977); Desforge v. City of West St. Paul, 231 Minn. 205, 208, 42
N.W.2d 633, 634 (1950); Urban Renewal Agency v. Tackett, 255 So. 2d 904, 905 (Miss. 1971);
Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Mo. 1968); Rascoe v. Town of Farmington, 62
N.M. 51, 55, 304 P.2d 575, 577 (1956); Brown v. Village of Deming, 56 N.M. 302, 316, 243 P.2d
609, 618 (1952); Long v. City of Charlotte, 306 N.C. 187, 208, 293 S.E.2d 101, 115 (1982); Ranells v.
City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 7-8, 321 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1975); Berke v. Ohio Dept. of Pub.
Welfare, 52 Ohio App. 2d 271, 273-74, 369 N.E.2d 1056, 1058 (1976); Nixon v. Oklahoma City, 555
P.2d 1283, 1285 (Okla. 1976); Township of Bensalem v. Press, 93 Pa. Commw. 235, 249, 501 A.2d
331, 338 (1985); Tipton County Bd. of Educ. v. Dennis, 561 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tenn. 1978); Johnson
v. Smith, 621 S.W.2d 570, 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981); San Antonio River Auth. v. Garrett Bros., 528
S.W.2d 266, 279 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975).
Frequently, decisions upholding awards of punitive damages against municipalities have lost
precedential value as a result of subsequent legislative or judicial action. For example, the court in
Young v. City of Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612, 622 (Iowa 1978), held that the same rules of liability
should apply to municipal and private corporations. Four years later, however, the Iowa Legislature
brought that state in line with the vast majority ofjurisdictions, providing for municipal liability for
punitive damages only when expressly imposed by statute. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 613A.4.5 (West
Supp. 1986); see also Sharapata v. Town of Islip, 56 N.Y.2d 332, 437 N.E.2d 1104,452 N.Y.S.2d 347
(1982) (overruling trial court decision holding that municipalities could be liable for punitive dam-
ages); Township of Bensalem v. Press, 93 Pa. Commw. 235, 501 A.2d 331 (1985) (overruling a
federal district court decision holding that municipalities may be liable for punitive damages under
Pennsylvania law). But cf. Ray v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich. App. 702, 707-08, 242 N.W.2d 494, 496
(1976) (noting that a municipal corporation may be liable for exemplary damages, when such dam-
ages are compensatory in nature and signify an enlargement of actual damages).
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Supreme Court adopted this rule in Long,5 6 an inverse condemnation and nui-
sance action arising out of the operation of Charlotte's Douglas International
Airport.
57
The supreme court's approval of the majority rule in Long has made it
necessary for the court to interpret individual statutes to determine whether they
contain express provisions permitting recovery of punitive damages against mu-
nicipal corporations. In Jackson the statute in question was North Carolina's
Wrongful Death Act. 58 Initially, the Act offered decedents' representatives a
right of action for the benefit of the decedents' heirs, but the damages recover-
able were strictly compensatory.59 In 1969 the North Carolina General Assem-
bly comprehensively rewrote the statute to provide for punitive damages.6° The
resulting Wrongful Death Act "in no way resemble[d] its predecessor, ' 61 espe-
cially regarding the availability of punitive damages. 62 The present wrongful
death statute clearly contemplates the award of punitive damages under proper
circumstances. 63 Against this background, the Jackson court undertook to de-
termine whether the wrongful death statute provides for punitive damages
against municipal corporations.
Prior to Jackson no North Carolina appellate level decision had sought to
determine whether a municipal corporation would fall within the scope of the
Wrongful Death Act's "person or corporation" language.64 Therefore, no bind-
ing precedent guided the Jackson court on the issue of municipal immunity from
punitive damages under the Wrongful Death Act.65 As a result, the court relied
56. 306 N.C. at 208, 293 S.E.2d at 115.
57. In deciding this issue of first impression in North Carolina, Justice Meyer, writing for the
majority, stated, "We hold that in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, municipal
corporations are immune from punitive damages." Id.
58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984); Jackson, 316 N.C. at 263, 341 S.E.2d at 526.
59. Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 226 N.C. 332, 337, 38 S.E.2d 105, 109 (1946).
60. See Act of April 14, 1969, ch. 215, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 194, 194.
61. Comment, The New North Carolina Wrongful Death Statute, 48 N.C.L. REV. 594, 595
(1970).
62. Byrd, Recent Developments in North Carolina Tort Law, 48 N.C.L. REv. 791, 801 (1970).
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984). In 1974 the general assembly repealed the 1969
statute, Act of April 14, 1969, ch. 215, § 1, 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 194, 194, and replaced it with the
present version, Act of April 12, 1974, ch. 1329, 1974 N.C. Sess. Laws 629 (codified at N.C. GEm.
STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1984)), which retains the provision for recovery of punitive damages. For the
relevant statutory language of the Wrongful Death Act, see supra note 2.
64. For the pertinent statutory language of the Wrongful Death Act, see supra note 2. In
Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App. 292, 299, 293 S.E.2d 675, 680 (1982). the only North Carolina
opinion attempting to define the scope of this statutory language, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals ruled there could be no recovery of punitive damages against the personal representative of a
deceased wrongdoer.
65. Nonetheless, the Housing Authority argued that the proscription of punitive damage claims
made against representatives of deceased wrongdoers, developed in Thorpe v. Wilson, 58 N.C. App.
292, 299, 293 S.E.2d 675, 680 (1982), should prohibit by analogy all punitive damage claims against
municipal corporations. See Jackson, 316 N.C. at 270, 341 S.E.2d at 530 (Meyer, J., dissenting);
Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 8. One reason for the court's holding in Thorpe was that "[t]he
death of the wrongdoer preclude[d] his being punished by the assessment of punitive damages."
Thorpe, 58 N.C. App. at 299, 293 S.E.2d at 680. Similarly, an imposition of punitive damages
against a municipal corporation would fail to punish the wrongdoer because those bearing the brunt
of the award would be the innocent taxpayers. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. The
Jackson majority, however, was not persuaded by this line of reasoning.
The court also lacked persuasive authority from other jurisdictions considering precisely the
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entirely66 on North Carolina's legislative rules of statutory construction67 in
finding that the general assembly intended to allow awards of punitive damages
against municipal corporations.68 The North Carolina Wrongful Death Act
provides for punitive damages against the "person" liable for the death,69 and
for purposes of statutory construction, the term "person" may include munici-
same issue. Research could discern no cases on point construing, for the purpose of determining
municipal liability for punitive damages, statutory language similar to that in Jackson.
Given the general presumption against municipal liability for punitive damages, see supra text
accompanying note 55, wrongful death actions frequently require courts to interpret wrongful death
statutes to determine if they contain the requisite express provision for punitive damages. Under the
general rule, whether a statute expressly provides for punitive damages is the threshold issue, and
courts often never reach the question of a municipal corporation's liability for such damages. See,
e.g., Bennett v. City of Cleveland, No. 50479, slip op. at 9 (Ohio Ct. App. June 5, 1986). The
Arizona Supreme Court, however, has confronted this issue. In State v. Sanchez, 119 Ariz. 64, 579
P.2d 568 (1978), the court announced that a plaintiff could not recover punitive damages from de-
fendant State of Arizona or its political subdivisions under the State's wrongful death statute. Id. at
68-69, 579 P.2d at 572-73. The court's reasoning was based on the public policy considerations that
have given rise to the general rule prohibiting the recovery of punitive damages against municipal
corporations. See id. at 66-67, 579 P.2d at 570-71; see also infra text accompanying notes 95-108
(discussing the policy considerations underlying the general rule). The wrongful death statute at
issue in Sanchez imposed liability for punitive damages on "the person or the corporation" responsi-
ble for the wrongful death, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-611, -613 (1982), but for purposes of
statutory construction the term "person" did not include bodies politic. See ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 1-215 (1973). The Arizona court could have denied plaintiff's claim for punitive damages
simply on the basis of this statute, but instead the court dealt directly with the policy implications of
subjecting municipal corporations to liability for punitive damages without delving into the mechan-
ics of statutory construction. See Sanchez, 119 Ariz. at 66-68, 579 P.2d at 570-72.
Perhaps the Jackson court chose not to look to Sanchez for guidance because the "person or
corporation" language in the Arizona statute simply could not be construed to include municipal
corporations. Yet the North Carolina Supreme Court should have noted that, notwithstanding the
rules of statutory construction, the Arizona court deemed the overriding policy considerations to be
dispositive of the issue of municipal liability for punitive damages.
In Brown v. Morgan County, 518 F. Supp. 661 (N.D. Ala. 1981), the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama noted that plaintiffs seeking recovery under that state's wrongful
death statute could receive only punitive damages; compensatory damages were not available. See
id. at 663; Hardin v. Sellers, 270 Ala. 156, 157-58, 117 So. 2d 383, 384-85 (1960); ALA. CODE § 6-5-
410 (1975). In that situation a plaintiff could recover punitive damages against a defendant munici-
pal corporation. See Brown, 518 F. Supp. at 663; see also Ray v. City of Detroit, 67 Mich. App. 702,
707-08, 242 N.W.2d 494, 496 (1976) (holding that municipal corporations may be liable for exem-
plary damages when such damages are "compensatory" in nature); Myers v. City of San Francisco,
42 Cal. 215, 217 (1871) (an antiquated precedent seldom relied on that equitably construed a wrong-
ful death statute to impose liability for punitive damages on municipalities).
In Bond v. City of Huntington, 276 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1981), the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals determined that, under that state's wrongful death statute, punitive damages could
be recovered in appropriate circumstances. Id. at 545. Thus, the court reversed the trial court's
summary judgment in favor of defendant municipality, but it never ruled on the question of munici-
pal liability for punitive damages, because the parties failed to raise the issue at trial. Id. at 546 n.9.
66. The majority opinion in Jackson never adopted, nor even discussed, the policy arguments
that weigh in favor of allowing punitive damages against municipal corporations. For example,
courts arguably should not create discriminatory double standards by denying indigent and low-to-
moderate income occupants of public housing the same avenues of recovery that are available to
tenants who can afford to rent from private landlords. See infra text accompanying notes 110-14.
Furthermore, according to an "enterprise liability" theory, the costs of a government's torts are
simply costs of government, and the public should maintain these costs in the form of taxes. Mem-
bers of the public benefit from government, and so it is reasonable to expect these citizens to bear the
costs of government. See infra text accompanying notes 115-16.
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12-3 (1986).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
69. See supra note 2.
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pal corporations. 70
In accordance with this syllogism, the court honored the "legislative in-
tent" underlying the Wrongful Death Act. As the majority maintained, had the
general assembly intended to shield municipal corporations from punitive dam-
age liability in wrongful death actions, it could have done so explicitly in the
statute.7 1 Furthermore, the court's holding appears consistent with the recent
trend of North Carolina courts in liberally granting punitive damages. 72 The
Jackson court reached its conclusion with noticeable ease,73 when in fact the
issues involved deserved considerable attention and analysis. Consequently, sev-
eral problems, including considerations of statutory construction and public pol-
icy, plague the majority opinion.
To apply the rule adopted in Long74 the court was required to determine
whether the Wrongful Death Act expressly provides for the availability of puni-
tive damages against municipal corporations. In his dissent, Justice Meyer ar-
gued that, in construing the statute, the court erred in two respects. 75 First,
based on the wording of the statute, a plaintiff should not be able to recover
punitive damages for wrongful death in a situation in which the decedent could
not have recovered such damages had the decedent lived.76 Had Mary Magda-
lene Jackson survived the carbon monoxide exposure, she could not have as-
serted a claim for punitive damages. Defendant was a municipal corporation 7
7
and there would have been no applicable statute expressly providing for punitive
damages, as required for an award of such damages by Long.78
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 12-3(6) (1986); see supra note 31.
71. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 264, 341 S.E.2d at 526.
72. Traditionally, punitive damages in North Carolina have been an "anomaly in the law," and
judges have manifested an "unwillingness to expand the doctrine beyond the limits imposed by au-
thoritative decisions of the court." Ervin, supra note 45, at 1256. In actions for fraud, for example,
plaintiffs in North Carolina were once required to demonstrate elements of insult, indignity, malice,
and oppression to win awards for punitive damages. See, eg., Swinton v. Savoy Realty Co., 236
N.C. 723, 726, 73 S.E.2d 785, 787 (1953), overruled by Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C.
105, 229 S.E.2d 297 (1976). In 1976 the supreme court overruled Swinton insofar as that holding
required aggravated conduct in addition to actionable fraud for a plaintiff to receive punitive dam-
ages. Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113-14, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976). The
North Carolina Court of Appeals recently held that punitive damages are recoverable against drunk
drivers without regard to motive or intent. Huff v. Chrismon, 68 N.C. App. 525, 532-33, 315 S.E.2d
711, 714, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 756, 321 S.E.2d 134 (1984).
73. The court settled the issue by simply allowing substitution of the words "body politic," see
supra note 31, for the word "person" in the wrongful death statute, see supra note 2. The court thus
inferred a legislative intent to subject municipal corporations to punitive damage liability in wrongful
death actions from this mere statutory implication. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 265, 341 S.E.2d at 527
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
74. In Long the North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the rule enunciated in the vast major-
ity ofjurisdictions, see supra note 55 and accompanying text, that, absent an express statutory provi-
sion to the contrary, punitive damages are not recoverable against a municipal corporation. Long,
306 N.C. at 208, 293 S.E.2d at 115.
75. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 265, 341 S.E.2d at 527 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
76. A plaintiff has an actionable claim under the Wrongful Death Act "[w]hen the death of a
person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of another, such as would, if the injured person
had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages therefor .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-
2(a) (1984).
77. Long, 306 N.C. at 208, 293 S.E.2d at 115.
78. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 265, 341 S.E.2d at 527 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see supra note 76.
Curiously, the majority opinion never specifically addressed this aspect of Justice Meyer's dissent.
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Second, in Justice Meyer's estimation, the court erred in interpreting the
Wrongful Death Act to provide expressly for punitive damages against munici-
pal corporations.7 9 The majority ignored the copious considerations of public
policy that militate against the imposition of punitive damages on municipali-
ties.80 The court mechanically substituted the language of one statute for that of
another.8 1 This overly formalistic approach, Meyer argued, resulted in an atten-
uated statutory construction, which, because of the policy implications involved,
could not have been consistent with the intentions of the general assembly in
drafting the wrongful death statute.
8 2
Certainly the Jackson court adhered to the letter of the legislative rule of
statutory interpretation in equating the word "person" in the Wrongful Death
Act with the term "body politic" in the rule of statutory construction. 3 None-
theless, the court overlooked several fundamental common-law rules of statu-
tory construction. For instance, statutes in derogation of the common law must
be strictly construed.8 4 In Long,8 5 the supreme court openly adopted the com-
mon-law rule proscribing the recovery of punitive damages against municipal
corporations.8 6 In Jackson, however, the court construed the statute in deroga-
tion of the rule to permit such a recovery, despite the absence of an express
provision for municipal liability.8 7 Municipal immunity from punitive damages
was the established common-law rule, and the wrongful death statute's language
was not sufficiently explicit to divest municipal corporations of this protection
firmly grounded in North Carolina law.88
Moreover, in divining the true meaning of a statute, the court should heed
such matters as the general state of the law at the time of the statute's enactment
and the prevailing public policies relating to that area of the law.8 9 The public
policy concerns that militate against the imposition of punitive damage liability
on municipal corporations 90 were no less valid in 1973, the year of the present
Wrongful Death Act's implementation. Thus, it is unreasonable to conclude
that the general assembly, against the formidable backdrop of judicial opinion
following the policy-laden general rule,9 1 would have contemplated the availa-
79. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 266, 341 S.E.2d at 527 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
80. See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
81. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 271, 341 S.E.2d at 530 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
84. Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 162, 86 S.E.2d 925, 927 (1955); McKinney v. Deneen,
231 N.C. 540, 542, 58 S.E.2d 107, 109 (1950); Grimes v. Grimes, 207 N.C. 778, 780, 178 S.E. 573,
574 (1935); see also Swift & Co. v. Tempelos, 178 N.C. 487, 491, 101 S.E. 8, 10 (1919) (statute is not
to be construed so as to include more than its plain and natural meaning.).
85. Long involved a claim for punitive damages in an inverse condemnation and nuisance suit.
See supra text accompanying note 57.
86. Long, 306 N.C. at 208, 293 S.E.2d at 115.
87. See Jackson, 316 N.C. at 271, 341 S.E.2d at 530 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
88. Id.; see Long, 306 N.C. at 206-08, 293 S.E.2d at 114-15.
89. Kendall v. Stafford, 178 N.C. 461, 464, 101 S.E. 15, 16 (1919); Nance v. Southern Ry., 149
N.C. 366, 374-75, 63 S.E. 116, 119 (1908).
90. See infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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bility of punitive damages against municipal corporations.92 At any rate, had
the general assembly intended to subject municipal corporations to punitive
damage liability, it would most likely have done so explicitly. 93 This supposition
is supported by the unmistakable reluctance on the part of the vast majority of
jurisdictions to grant recovery of punitive damages against municipal
corporations.
9 4
Not only did the Jackson court interpret the wrongful death statute
broadly, but it did so in the face of various adverse public policy ramifications.
Most immediately, the court's holding in Jackson offends the two principal ra-
tionales that gave rise to the rule prohibiting awards of punitive damages against
municipal corporations absent explicit statutory provisions to the contrary.95
The first of these rationales pertains to the central function of punitive damages:
punishment. One purpose of punitive damages is to vindicate the public by pun-
ishing wrongdoers. 96 An award of punitive damages against a municipal corpo-
ration, however, serves only to penalize and burden the public by raising the
costs of government and by increasing the public's tax liability.97 The United
States Supreme Court has asserted, "Neither reason nor justice suggests that
such retribution should be visited upon the shoulders of blameless or unknowing
taxpayers."19 8 Yet, with respect to wrongful death actions, the Jackson court has
effectively provided for windfalls to plaintiffs at the expense of the public.9 9
The second of the two principal rationales apparently unheeded by the
Jackson court is the deterrent function of punitive damages. Courts grant puni-
tive damages to deter future willful or wanton conduct.1°° Yet when a court
awards punitive damages against a municipal corporation, it is by no means self-
evident that public officials will be deterred from the conduct sought to be de-
92. See Jackson, 316 N.C. at 271, 341 S.E.2d at 530 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
93. See id.
94. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
96. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981); Jackson, 316 N.C. at 268,
341 S.E.2d at 529 (Meyer, J., dissenting); 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 51, § 53.18a, at 221.
97. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267; Jackson, 316 N.C. at 269, 341 S.E.2d at 529 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting); 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 51, § 53.18a, at 221; see supra note 52 and accompanying
text.
98, Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267. In Fact Concerts, the United States Supreme Court, in
ruling that municipalities are exempt from punitive damages in actions brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1982), further discussed the undesirable policy ramifications flowing from an allowance of
punitive damages against municipal corporations:
Punitive damages by definition are not intended to compensate the injured party, but
rather to punish the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious, and to
deter him and others from similar extreme conduct. Regarding retribution, it remains true
that an award of punitive damages against a municipality "punishes" only the taxpayers,
who took no part in the commission of the tort. These damages are assessed over and
above the amount necessary to compensate the injured party .... Indeed, punitive dam-
ages imposed on a municipality are in effect a windfall to a fully compensated plaintiff, and
are likely accompanied by an increase in taxes or a reduction of public services for the
citizens footing the bill.
Id. at 266-67.
99. See id. at 267; Jackson, 316 N.C. at 269, 341 S.E.2d at 529 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
100. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; 18 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 51, § 53.18a, at
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terred. 10 1 The mere threat of punitive damages is no more likely to deter a
public official from such conduct than are general expectations that public offi-
cials will perform their jobs well.10 2 Nor is it clear that the discharge of the
tortfeasor-public official will inevitably follow simply as a result of a recovery of
punitive damages from a municipal corporation.10 3 Courts and scholars agree,
on the other hand, that sufficient measures of deterrence are available through
the electoral process, so that an official with a public record stained by evidence
of deplorable conduct will lose his or her position at the hands of the voting
public.10o
The Jackson holding also contravenes public policy in other respects. Be-
cause wrongful death plaintiffs in North Carolina may now seek punitive dam-
ages against municipal corporations, courts will allow evidence of the unlimited
taxing power of the defendant municipal corporations.10 5 The door is therefore
open to ever larger damage awards, and the risk of fiscal devastation to munici-
pal corporations is apparent, 10 6 especially in light of the prevailing municipal
insurance crisis.10 7 Furthermore, allowing punitive damage awards will deplete
municipal funds that would otherwise finance governmental services, allowing
101. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
102. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 268; Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo.
1968); Ranells v. City of Cleveland, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 6-7, 321 N.E.2d 885, 888 (1975); 18 E. Mc-
QUILLIN, supra note 51, § 53.18a, at 221.
In Fact Concerts the United States Supreme Court maintained:
[lt is far from clear that municipal officials... would be deterred from wrongdoing by the
knowledge that large punitive awards could be assessed based on the wealth of their munic-
ipality .... Thus, assuming, arguendo, that the responsible official is not impervious to
shame and humiliation, the impact on the individual tortfeasor of this deterrence in the air
is at best uncertain.
453 U.S. at 268-69.
103. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 268-69; Jackson, 316 N.C. at 269, 341 S.E.2d at 529 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting).
104. E.g., Chappell v. City of Springfield, 423 S.W.2d 810, 814 (Mo. 1968); 18 E. MCQUILLIN,
supra note 51, § 53.18a, at 221; Note, supra note 52, at 276. The electoral process is thought to deter
unelected officials as well from committing egregious acts, because these individuals are accountable
to superior officials who are answerable to the voting public. 18 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 51,
§ 53.18a, at 221.
105. See, eg., Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 1965); Ranells v. City of Cleve-
land, 41 Ohio St. 2d 1, 8, 321 N.E.2d 885, 889 (1975); Note, supra note 52, at 277.
106. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 272, 341 S.E.2d at 531 (Meyer, J., dissenting). In City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), the United States Supreme Court, in denying the recovery
of punitive damages against municipalities in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), stated:
Under this expanded liability, municipalities and other units of state and local government
face the possibility of having to assure compensation for persons harmed by abuses of
governmental authority covering a large range of activity in everyday life. To add the
burden of exposure for the malicious conduct of individual government employees may
create a serious risk to the financial integrity of these governmental entities.
Id. at 270.
107. See generally Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 48
(discussing the municipal insurance crisis and its causes, such as the evaporation of municipal tort
immunity, the recent tort litigation explosion, and the increase in damage awards); Hunter & Borzil-
led, The Liability Insurance Crisis: Insurers Put the Squeeze on Consumers, TRIAL, April 1986, at
42 (discussing some of the problems caused by increases in insurance premiums and suggesting
solutions); Young, Tort Judgment Against Cities: The Sky's the Limit, 1983 DET. C.L. REv. 1509
(discussing the causes and consequences of large verdicts imposed on municipalities).
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individual plaintiffs to profit at the expense of the general public.108 The Jack-
son court, however, failed to consider these questions of public policy. Rather,
the court, by relying on a formalistic construction of the wrongful death statute,
was convinced that the general assembly had intended to remove municipal im-
munity from punitive damages. The court neither disputed the Housing Au-
thority's policy arguments nor advanced any policy justifications on behalf of its
holding. 109
This is not to say, however, that no policy rationales support the majority
holding. Judge Phillips of the court of appeals noted, for instance, that courts
should not promote discriminatory double standards by limiting the avenues of
recovery available to penurious tenants of public housing; recovery of punitive
damages, after all, is open to more affluent tenants who rent from private land-
lords.110 As a practical matter, a rule altogether precluding the recovery of pu-
nitive damages against municipal corporations would divest indigent tenants of
an opportunity available to private tenants. Such a rule, however, would not
signify any deprivation of a right because punitive damages are a matter of jury
discretion and are not given as of right.111 Furthermore, punitive damages,
designed to punish and deter egregious conduct, are not compensation, but are
instead a windfall awarded over and above what is necessary to make the plain-
tiff "whole." 112 Because an imposition of punitive damages on a municipality
will not advance the principal purposes of such damages, 113 a punitive damages
award appears even more like a private benefit. In balancing public policy con-
siderations, it is better that the innocent taxpaying public be spared the need of
paying a penalty than a plaintiff receive a private windfall at the public's
expense. 114
Advocates of the majority decision in Jackson might also argue that dam-
ages paid by a municipality in an action brought on the basis of a governmental
tort simply represent a cost of.government, and that this cost should be borne by
the public through the payment of taxes; the same citizens who benefit from
government services should be responsible for the various costs of govern-
ment. 115 Again, however, the extraordinary nature of punitive damages under-
mines the validity of such a contention. To the extent that one accepts the
108. See, e.g., James, supra note 33, at 621; Comment, supra note 33, at 53; Note, supra note 33,
at 643.
109. See supra notes 65-66. Furthermore, the majority merely admitted the existence of the
Housing Authority's policy arguments. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 265, 341 S.E.2d at 526. The general
assembly's intent as manifested in the wrongful death statute, insisted the court, was the overriding
concern. Id.
110. See Jackson, 73 N.C. App. at 371, 326 S.E.2d at 300; see also supra note 18 (discussing the
discriminatory effect of a rule denying public housing tenants the right to recover punitive damages
against public housing authorities).
111. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
112. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267 (1981); Jackson, 316 N.C. at 269,
341 S.E.2d at 530 (Meyer, 3., dissenting).
113. See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
114. See Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 267; Jackson, 316 N.C. at 269, 341 S.E.2d at 529 (Meyer, J.,
dissenting); 18 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 51, § 53.18a, at 221.
115. See Smith v. State, 289 N.C. 303, 312-13, 222 S.E.2d 412, 419 (1976); James, supra note 33,
at 614; Comment, supra note 33, at 55.
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"enterprise liability" theory, the compensation, or "making whole" of a plaintiff
injured as the result of tortious conduct of a municipal agent would qualify as a
just cost of government. 116 Once again, however, an allowance of punitive dam-
ages, the purposes of which are to punish and deter aggravated conduct,1 17 is a
windfall to the plaintiff who already has been made whole through the payment
of compensatory damages. 118 This payment is not a valid cost of government.
The highest duty of any government should be to its broad base of taxpaying
constituents.
To sustain a holding in defiance of the weight of the Housing Authority's
persuasive policy arguments should have required a forceful demonstration of
the general assembly's clear intent to remove municipal immunity from punitive
damages in wrongful death actions. Yet the Jackson court upheld the availabil-
ity of these damages on the basis of a bare inference of legislative intent
grounded in "the simple tactic of reading the words 'body politic' into a statu-
tory provision which 'merely provides for punitive damages.'"119 The rule
adopted by the supreme court in Long provides for municipal immunity against
punitive damages, except when statutory authority expressly removes the immu-
nity.1 20 The Wrongful Death Act embodies no such express statutory
provision.
1 2 1
The North Carolina Supreme Court has both misapplied the rule in
Long,122 and misconstrued the Wrongful Death Act. Absent an express statu-
tory provision to the contrary, it is not reasonable to infer a legislative intent to
impose punitive damage liability on municipal corporations, especially in light of
the decisive policy factors that favor the maintenance of municipal immunity
against punitive damages.1 23 Any provision in the wrongful death statute for
punitive damages against municipal corporations, if indeed such a provision ex-
ists, is by no means express. The Jackson court's decision lacks merit from both
a logical and a pragmatic point of view, and the North Carolina General Assem-
116. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
119. Jackson, 316 N.C. at 271, 341 S.E.2d at 530 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority
opinion).
120. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
121. Justice Meyer declared:
Had our legislature intended to authorize the recovery of punitive damages in this situa-
tion, it could have done so by including "municipal corporations" when it provided "the
person or corporation" language in the wrongful death statute. The reasoning of the ma-
jority in its analysis that the definition of person in the remote N.C.G.S. § 12-3(6) should
be read into the wrongful death provision of N.C.G.S. Chapter 28A is strained and untena-
ble. It is inescapable that the Wrongful Death Act contains no "express statutory author-
ity" for recovery of punitive damages against municipalities as required by Long.
Jackson, 316 N.C. at 271, 341 S.E.2d at 530 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
122. See supra note 74.
123. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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bly should now come forward and clarify its position regarding punitive damage
liability for municipal corporations under the Wrongful Death Act.
BENJAMIN W. BALDWIN
